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One hundred and eight participants either stole or replaced a stolen
exam key from a professor’s office. Half of the participants were instructed
to respond honestly and to help with an investigation; the other half were
instructed to distort their statement so they were not implicated. Participants
did not know whether they would be asked to lie or report honestly during
their time in the professor’s office. After completing the task, participants
again met with a research assistant, who instructed them whether to lie or
respond honestly at a one-week follow-up. After the interview, participants
completed a Likert-type post-event questionnaire. Deceivers reported signifi-
cantly more anxiety and motivation not to get caught while in the office, even
though there were no differences in the instructions given to the two groups
until after participants left the office. Therefore, the act of deception changed
their memory for their time in the office. This is important theoretically be-
cause it suggests that forming a lie script could be akin to other memories
for counterfactual thinking. Practically, it is important to note that a decep-
tive perpetrator or detainee may never be able to actually provide an accu-
rate account.
Though a great deal of research attention has been given to post-event
memory distortion, only a few researchers have focused on memory change
as a result of deception. Pickel (1) reported two such studies. In the first,
participants watched a video of a robbery, were immediately interviewed in
one of four conditions designed to affect memory, and then asked to return
one week later to complete a questionnaire that assessed memory accuracy.
At the interview, participants were instructed to either: fabricate information
about the clerk, fabricate information about the robber, respond honestly, or
complete a distracter task without recall of the video (this group is referred to
as the no rehearsal group). After these interviews were completed, partici-
pants were instructed to return in one week for the memory questionnaire.
Participants were specifically instructed not to provide information from the
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interview in response to the questionnaire. However, the act of fabrication
during the interview seemed to affect the quality of information that the par-
ticipants provided to the questionnaire. The group that fabricated information
about the clerk and the distracter group provided the largest number of inac-
curate details regarding the clerk. Similarly, the group that fabricated infor-
mation about the robber and the distracter group provided the largest number
of inaccurate details regarding the robber. From this, it appears that the act of
fabrication counteracted the benefit of rehearsal, so that the fabrication group
performed the same as the no rehearsal group. Interestingly, this reduction in
accuracy was specific to the object of the fabrication. Those who fabricated
about the clerk showed reduced accuracy about the clerk; those who fabri-
cated about the robber showed reduced accuracy about the robber.
In the second study (1), participants viewed the same video of a robbery,
were interviewed in one of three conditions designed to affect memory, and
were again asked to return one week later to complete a questionnaire that
assessed memory accuracy. The three conditions were created by instructions
to: fabricate regarding the robber, respond honestly, or to memorize a set of
fabrications that were provided by the experimenter. Once again, participants
were specifically instructed not to let the information that they provided to
the interview affect their responses to the questionnaire. However, the act of
fabrication still affected the information provided to the questionnaire. For
those who fabricated details regarding the robber, 37% of the information
presented to the questionnaire was mistakenly derived from the interview.
Similarly, for those who memorized the set of fabrications, 56% of the in-
formation presented to the questionnaire was mistakenly derived from the
interview. There was no similar carryover effect for honest reporters.
The results from Pickel’s experiments demonstrated that although the
subjects were asked to use information that they remembered directly from
the video to answer the questionnaire, they were not always able to do this.
The act of preparing responses based upon fabricated information funda-
mentally altered the participant’s memory for the original event.
Along this line, the current study examined whether deception can alter a
suspect’s original memory for an event. Previous research dealt only with
those who witnessed a video. The current study examined similar effects, but
focused on a person who actually committed what they perceived to be a
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small crime. This is potentially significant, in that it has always been as-
sumed that those who choose to lie have the ability to still remember the
truth. So, the task of the interviewer or interrogator is to cause a deceptive
suspect to abandon their deception and provide their genuine memory for the
alleged crime (and maybe a confession). However, if deception permanently
alters the suspect’s memory for the original event, it may not be possible for
them to recall what actually happened. If this is true, then even a willing sus-
pect who was formally deceptive may no longer be able to provide accurate
information regarding the event in question. Therefore, this distortion of




One hundred and thirteen participants completed the task of this study in
the psychology department of a university in the Northeastern United States.
Five of these participants were dropped due to not following experimental
instructions to respond honestly or deceptively (i.e., participants in the honest
group did not respond honestly, or vice versa), or due to incomprehensible
portions of their later recorded interviews. Of the remaining one hundred and
eight participants, 64% were female and 36% were male. Sixty-six percent
described themselves as Caucasian, 23% as African American, and 11% as
Asian-American.
Procedure
Participants either stole or replaced a stolen exam key from a psychology
professor’s office. This difference in taking versus leaving the exam key was
not an experimental factor, but was added to allow for research assistants to
verify that each participant followed directions. If the test was not in the of-
fice or brought back to the experimenter as scheduled, then it would be obvi-
ous that a participant had not behaved as directed. During the commission of
this small crime, students were under the impression that the professor who
used the office and campus police did not know of the experiment. They
thought they were committing a genuine offense, but that the experimenter
would intervene on their behalf. They did not think they would ultimately be
held responsible, but that, if caught, there would be a great deal of difficulty
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in reconciling the situation. One-half of the participants were instructed to
respond honestly and to help with an investigation, while the other half were
instructed to distort their statement so that they were not implicated in any
wrongdoing. Participants did not know whether they would be asked to lie or
report honestly during their time in the professor’s office. After completing
the assigned task, participants again met with a research assistant, who in-
structed them whether to lie or respond honestly, and also made an appoint-
ment for an investigative interview one week later. Each group was promised
that if they convinced the interviewer at the upcoming investigation, they
would get $2, and that the two “best statements” would each win $100. At
the following interview, participants completed a Likert-type questionnaire
regarding their experiences in the study (Appendix 1). The questions of in-
terest for the current study assessed level of anxiety while in the room, and
level of motivation to succeed at their assigned task while in the room. Par-
ticipants were then fully debriefed and told that they had not committed any
real violation, and were warned about the dire consequences of genuine aca-
demic dishonesty. The level of verisimilitude in this experiment was viewed
as acceptable by the Internal Review Board for the Protection of Human Re-
search Participants because the purpose of the experiment was to obtain in-
formation that could be generalized to police investigations. Also, a pilot was
run, and participants rated their anxiety during the task as lower than what
they felt while taking an exam or giving an in-class presentation.1
RESULTS
As mentioned above, the data were first screened to make certain that all
participants followed their assigned condition. Five cases were dropped,
leaving a sample of 108. Because the data gathered were Likert-type, there
was no reason to assess for outliers or colinearity. This left 54 honest and 54
deceptive participants.
Participants did not know whether they were to respond honestly or de-
ceptively while they were in the professor’s office, stealing or replacing the
exam key. They were assigned to these conditions after completing that por-
tion of the experiment. After they were assigned to report honestly or decep-
                                                      
1 If students were not less anxious about cheating than taking exams, then academic
dishonesty would never occur.
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tively, they were given approximately one week to prepare for an investiga-
tive interview. Following the interview, participants completed the Likert-
type questions listed in Appendix 1. They were asked to rate the amount of
motivation they felt to complete the task, and to rate how anxious they were
while completing the task. Participants assigned to the honest group reported
a mean motivational level of 3.2 (sd = 1.2), while participants assigned to the
deceptive group reported a mean motivational level of 5.3 (sd = .9). Simi-
larly, participants assigned to the honest group reported a mean anxiety level
of 3.8 (sd = 1.4), while participants assigned to the deceptive group reported
a mean anxiety level of 5.0 (sd = .7). The effect size for the observed mean
difference between honest and deceptive participants for their remembered
level of motivation = d = 1.8. For the observed difference between honest
and deceptive participants in their remembered level of anxiety, d = 1.1.
A factorial ANOVA was used to determine whether instructions to re-
spond honestly or deceptively after the event had significantly affected par-
ticipants’ memories for the event as measured by the Likert-type scales. This
indicated a significant relationship between honesty versus deception condi-
tion and participants’ memories for the event, F(1, 106) = 3.7, p  < .05. At
the time of the follow-up interview, deceptive participants reported being
more anxious while in the professor’s office, t(100) = -2.6, p < .05, and de-
ceptive participants reported being more motivated while in the professor’s
office, t(100) = -2.7, p < .052. This indicated that instructions to respond
honestly or deceptively, which were provided after the participants left the
professor’s office, distorted their memory for the time they spent in their of-
fice.
DISCUSSION
The participants in this experiment did not know whether they would be
responding honestly or deceptively while they were in the professor’s office
(either stealing or replacing a stolen exam key). They were assigned to report
honestly or deceptively after they had completed the assigned task regarding
the exam key. Interestingly, those who were instructed to deceive after leav-
ing the office reported experiencing significantly more anxiety while they
were in the professor’s office. Similarly, these deceivers also reported expe-
riencing a significantly higher level of motivation to escape detection while
in the professor’s office. This becomes important when one considers that
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participants did not know whether they were going to deceive or respond
honestly when they were in the office. The experiences of deceivers and
honest reporters were identical while in the professor’s office. Therefore,
these reported differences in experience among deceivers represent a change
in memory of the event as a result of their later attempt at deception. This
finding is consistent with research that demonstrates the act of confabulation
or deception can cause a change in original memory for the original event
among witnesses (1, 2). The current study extends this change of memory
due to deception to suspects.
Many researchers have focused on the different requirements of honest
responding versus deception during an investigative interview. Porter and
Yuille (3) described this process as superficial encoding, while Granhag et al.
(4) discussed the repeat versus reconstruct hypothesis, and Colwell et al. (5,
6) described the use of lie scripts. All of these researchers are emphasizing
the fact that honest respondents are free to think about what actually hap-
pened during an interview. Conversely, deceivers attempt to block their
memory for the original event, and instead provide information from another
source (one they have previously spoken or previously rehearsed). The pre-
sent study indicates that the process of inhibiting the original memory while
responding with a different or modified version may have detrimental effects
on the respondent’s ability to later retrieve the actual memory. This may be
an error of retrieval, an error of source monitoring, or some other type of
contamination. Lying may be a form of post-event misinformation (7), or
lying about a complex event may be similar to the process of “imagination
inflation.”
Imagination inflation has been described by a number of researchers.
Garry and colleagues (8) demonstrated that participants who have imagined
that they have experienced a past event later report that event as more likely
to have occurred.  Imagining a past event has also been shown to create false
memories.  Mazzoni and Memon (9) asked participants to imagine a medical
procedure that, while plausible, had not been performed in their geographical
area.  These participants later reported memories of the event, and did so at a
rate higher than those who were just exposed to information about the proce-
dure.  One possible explanation for the imagination inflation effect is a
source monitoring error (10)—in the present research, participants may in-
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correctly attribute the anxiety associated with the imagined behavior with the
actual behavior. It may also be that participants report they felt anxious in the
office because the feelings of anxiety they felt in creating and imagining
their deception story are more accessible and familiar at the time of the test
(11). Of course, these explanations are not mutually exclusive, and further
research would be needed, but it is clear that the instruction to create a de-
ception story altered the participants’ memories for the actual event.
This is potentially significant, in that it has always been assumed that
suspects who choose to lie still have the ability to remember the truth. The
traditional task of the interviewer or interrogator is to cause a deceptive sus-
pect to abandon their deception and provide their genuine memory for the
event in question (and maybe a confession). In this way, investigators hope
to make accurate decisions and solve the maximum number of cases. The
current laboratory finding suggests that the act of deception permanently al-
ters memory for the original event. If this is true in the real world, then a de-
ceptive suspect may no longer be able to provide accurate information re-
garding the event in question. A lie can “become the truth” (1), or otherwise
contaminate the suspect’s memory.
 This study indicated that lying changes the memory of suspects. The
participants of the study knew that they were not in a true investigation, but
they did have a chance for significant financial gain determined by their per-
formance. If the same change in memory happens during an investigation,
then the investigators would have no way of obtaining complete and accurate
information about the original event. This effect highlights the difficulty of
making decisions based upon the information provided from any single sus-
pect or witness. Thus, the change of memory as a result of deception seen in
this study indicates a need for future research in the area, 1) to determine the
extent that the observed effects can be generalized to investigative settings,
and 2) if any interviewing or credibility assessment techniques can be used to
assist investigators in instances with limited sources of information (e.g., 6).
If the changes in memory due to deception are relatively minor, then the real-
world applications will not likely be affected. However, if these changes are
potentially large, then investigators need some tool to help them separate
genuine recall from distortion.
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APPENDIX 1
 Participant #: __________________________________________
 
 Please rate the importance of these things in making your story sound convincing by
circling the most appropriate number under each of the following:
 
 1. How motivated were you to not get caught during the time in the professor’s
office?
 Not motivated Motivated Very Motivated
 1 2 3 4 5  6        7 
 2. How anxious or upset were you during the time you spent in the professor’s
office?
 Relaxed Somewhat anxious / upset  Very anxious / upset
 1 2 3 4 5  6        7 
 3. When telling your story, were you more or less anxious than when taking a final
exam? _____________
 
 4. When telling your story, were you more or less anxious than when giving an in-
class presentation? _____________
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